Tuesday, August 20, 2013

Criminal Investigation of Terrorism and Organized Crime



Criminal Investigation of  Terrorism and Organized Crime
                                                       
 By
Asad Jahangir Khan

     Crime pattern reveals an increasing trend in use of firearms. This has led to a spurt in serious crime. Murder increased from 1,795 in 2000 to 3,548 in 2011 in Sindh. In crime against property an increasing trend is visible in use of firearms. In 2000, Sindh police recorded 3,678 offenses against property in which firearms were used. In 2011, this figure had increased to 11,537. Kidnapping for ransom grew from 73 in 2000 to 182 in 2011.
   Police action against illicit firearms is also rising. In 2000, Sindh police registered 5,713 cases for illicit weapons. In 2011, this figure increased to 14,030.
   Another alarming trend is the rise in organized crime. Stolen vehicles can be recovered on payment by approaching the right ‘Don’. Other organized crimes are extortion, gambling, prostitution, drugs, alcohol and arms.
  It may also be added that Terrorism uses tactics similar to organized crime in spreading fear and in collecting funds. Although there is a special law for Terrorism, no special investigation procedures have been laid down. Therefore, the procedure laid down by Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) is followed.
  The biggest problem in dealing with these crimes is that there is no law which effectively targets them. Only the law on narcotics is designed to deal with organized drug cartels. A similar law for dealing with these rackets is necessary if these ‘illicit businesses’ are to be dismantled.
   The police is investigating these rackets at the police station level without establishing specialized units for this purpose. Karachi has only one specialized unit dealing with vehicle theft. There are no specialized units to investigate other organized rackets.    Unless specialized units are created these rackets cannot be tackled.
    One problem in creating specialized units for organized crime is that the law does not encourage their establishment. The CrPC empowers only the ‘officer in-charge of the police station’ (SHO) to hear a complaint or register a FIR. Only he can investigate an offense. When another officer is detailed for investigation, he must submit his report to the SHO. When the investigation is completed its report is to be submitted to the court only by the SHO. To enable the establishment of specialized crime units there is need to amend the law. The term ‘officer in-charge of the police station’ wherever used in the CrPC should be replaced by the words ‘police officer’.
  It is also necessary to see if the CrPC enables the investigation of these rackets. It seems from the provisions contained in this law that investigation of these rackets cannot be carried out unless amendments are made to this law.
   Absolute secrecy is required in investigation of these rackets. Under the existing law secrecy is impossible. Section 157 CrPC lays down that a report of every cognizable offense is to be sent to the magistrate. Police Rule 24.5 lays down that a copy of the FIR shall be sent along with this report. This means that a copy of the FIR can be obtained by anyone. The Police Rules need to state that copy of FIR should not be circulated with the report. The report should only state that a case has been registered and is being investigated. Other details which would link the crime to criminal should not be included.
   Amendments are also required in Section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code to ensure secrecy. Subsection 1(a) lays down that the report to the magistrate ‘shall include the names of persons acquainted with the circumstances of the case’. Such a provision of law exposes the police and witnesses to grave danger. The witnesses and the evidence have to be secured against any threat to neutralize or destroy them. Otherwise racketeers cannot be brought to book. A proviso may be added to this section that if the police suspects that witnesses would face grave danger, the names of witnesses and parts of statements which would enable identification, should be withheld. 
    The second requirement for investigation of this crime is time. Investigation of rackets is time consuming as the whole ‘business’ has to targeted. A proviso to Section 173 CrPC does not give more than seventeen days to police for the investigation of any offense. After this the report of investigation has to be submitted to the court and ‘the court shall commence the trial on the basis of such interim report, unless, for reasons to be recorded, the Court decides that the trial should not so commence’. This proviso was added by an amendment whereas Subsection 1 states that investigation ‘shall be completed without unnecessary delay’.
   Clearly the law does not give police adequate time to investigate rackets. As such the police can only take action against the ‘soldier’ in the racket but it cannot target the entire business. The proviso needs to be deleted.
    Statements of witnesses are required to be recorded by a magistrate in the presence of the accused (Sec 164 CrPC). As a result of this provision the witness cannot be protected. There is need to empower police to record statements of witnesses during investigation.
   The Prosecution Agency also needs to be on the same page regarding investigation into these rackets. Secrecy has to be maintained in this agency. Therefore, rules and regulations are necessary to ensure absolute secrecy within this agency throughout investigation and trial proceedings.
   It must be emphasized that organized crime and racketeering has to be dealt on priority basis otherwise it will spread to other legitimate businesses. A special law is required to deal specifically with racketeering. There is need for amendments in CrPC to enable police to investigate the entire racket. The police must establish specialized units for this purpose. The Prosecution Agency should have rules and regulations to guarantee secrecy in handling this illicit business. These measures would also help improve the investigation and prosecution of Terrorism. Unless this is done, organized crime and terrorism cannot be tackled and dismantled.




Monday, August 19, 2013

Shooting Incident in Islamabad




“Armed Man Episode in Islamabad:
Lessons on Effective Crisis Management and Ethical Media Practices”

Shooting incident
     On 15th August, 2013 evening an armed man with his wife and two small children armed with automatic weapons managed to reach near the red zone on the Jinnah Avenue of Islamabad where he was intercepted. He challenged the Islamabad police by brandishing his weapons and firing in the air. It should have been a minor incident to be handled at the police station level immediately but this did not happen as the entire police and the Ministry of Interior got involved. It lasted for six hours till a citizen took the initiative in his hands and forced the police to act and bringing to an end this episode that exposed some serious flaws in the preparedness of police of the capital and response of the government.

Stake holders and their roles
    There were three stakeholders in this scenario; the government, the media the citizens and children of the armed man. The role of the government, which includes the entire executive structure of the state i.e. Ministry of Interior and Islamabad Capital Territory administration, was to engineer a successful outcome for the episode involving a rogue gunman who held the city country hostage for more than five hours. The role of the media was to provide informative and responsible coverage of the incident for viewer consumption. The citizens, who were required to support the government in this situation and extend their cooperation to Police. Their presence on the scene as spectators complicated matters and made it difficult for police to take decisive action. The children of the armed gunman were the most important silent stake holder whose life, security and welfare were at stake.

     The analysis of shooting incident in Islamabad will help us understand better the roles and responses of different stakeholders, inter alia police/law enforcement agencies, political leadership, media and the public. This may, in turn, influence decision making processes vis-à-vis similar incidents in the future.
Crisis management mechanism
      We lack proper crisis management and at the federal level it is limited to crisis management cell in the Ministry of Interior that coordinates the exchange of intelligence reports and keeps track of any events, but this cell has no operational role and lack response mechanism. Each police force is required to develop its own crisis management mechanism keeping in view emerging challenges.
       For tackling a range of situations, training has been imparted to the officers at the supervisory level with the support of foreign experts. At the operational level, this training has not translated into concrete SOPs for situations that can be classified only broadly as each incident is unique in nature. In such cases, only broad guidelines need to be followed. This does not seem to have happened in this case. The police force has a large number of trained staff at the tactical and operational levels in the lower ranks who are adequately equipped to deal with a situation of this kind. The police, however, do not have the resources to deal with a heavily armed onslaught like the one we have witnessed in recent jailbreaks and string of incidents in Swat before the army was called in to restore the writ of the state. Tragically, the civilian provincial government has failed to replace such intervention with an effective law enforcement structure.

Command and control structure
       The question centers on whether the command and control structure was well placed and whether it dealt effectively with the episode. The answer in one word is NO. There are three levels of decision making:  policy, strategy and tactical. All these need to be carefully calibrated to ensure that these complement one another rather than act counterproductively in the course of life threatening situations. Under normal circumstances, one would expect a defined policy by the top leadership to deal with terrorism. Such a policy would provide guidelines to the implementation agencies for devising their strategy and plan at the tactical level. This is not done during an ongoing operation but well before the incident. Here there was neither a policy nor a strategy; therefore, the operational commander in the frontline was clueless and was unable to devise a tactical plan. The Minister gave instructions that, under no circumstances, should the police use force endangering the lives of the children and the wife of the offender who was holding the city hostage. Instructions from the Minister restricted their actions, and the drama continued for hours. Amidst this confusion, other actors started intervening. These ranged from politicians to media persons whose intervention compounded the existing chaos. There were practically no defined parameters to restrict the interference in an ongoing emergency that should have been tactically handled by the police on ground. It was the duty of the senior police leadership to ignore such instructions and to explain the risks to the minister. These orders were not resisted, and the initiative was snatched by others thus forcing the police into action. The operational decision needs to be taken by the field officers who can also be held accountable if they cross the   limitations defined by the law.
      The operational commander who did not follow even the basic standards of dealing with an episode of this nature must share the blame. Briefly, the area was not cordoned off at a safe distance from the scene and the people approaching the offender were not stopped. Similarly, access to the cellular phone line of the gunman was not jammed. Both these things could have been done easily. Police do this as a matter of routine  during VIP movements. The cell phone could have been cut off by instructing the service provider or by deploying a jammer. For six long hours, the police leadership failed to take any initiative except to buy time due to the instructions received from the Minister. They had three clear options: 1)Negotiation to resolve the standoff 2) to disarm him by sending their elite personnel in disguise, or to use force that could result in causality  3) to give him safe passage and intercept him outside the city.
Prolonging the incident created frustration, ambiguity, fear and many other negative impressions about the capabilities of police. From the outset, it was evident that there was an absence of skill-based incident management ranging from incident-scene management, area cordoning, public/spectator control, negotiation skills, media management, inter agency coordination etc.
    One of the objectives of a prolonged dialogue, besides convincing the armed man to surrender peacefully, was also to buy time and prepare different strategies/plans. However, this was not evident in this case, and after a lapse of almost six hours, no clear strategy was observed.
    Lack of management at the scene of incident did not only put the lives of the armed man and his family members at risk but also those of the hundreds of spectators who could have fallen prey to indiscriminate shooting or any other collateral damage.
    The wavering on the part of the authorities bordered on paralysis. This tarnished the image of the police and highlighted the incompetence of the government in dealing with a minor incident that should have been wrapped up by the junior-level functionaries of the police within one hour. It raised serious concerns about the safety of the capital of the country.
Role of media and Responsibility of police in media management
     As stated earlier, no one, including the media, should have been permitted by the police to go beyond a defined distance towards the crime scene. Here the responsibility rested squarely on the shoulders of the police. However, with the new technology and long range lenses, the media had the capability to televise the scene. The reporting was most irresponsible. The ramifications of such coverage are extremely negative; these include grave operational implications and offer unpalatable incentives for any madman to get uninterrupted live coverage for six hours.  Operationally, I would like to mention only two serious episodes- one at the Munawa Police Training Center and the other at the Mumbai attack where the handlers anywhere in the world had a running commentary with live coverage that enabled them to alerting the terrorists in the field in action via cell phones. In this case, investigation can uncover whether his handlers if any used the live coverage as a resource to enable the gunman to further his plan of action. It would appear that he only wanted live coverage, and the media readily obliged.
     Live coverage of the entire episode shed light on any and every action of police as well as those of the armed man and his family leaving all stakeholders exposed to any adverse reaction by known and unknown persons. Direct engagement with and televised interview of the armed man on different TV channels was far beyond the role of the media. The media is supposed to update the public on important events rather to to create the event or the news.
      Understandably, the media is hungry for information on such dramatic incidents; therefore, it is imperative that the police department should have a public relations wing with trained personnel who should brief the media about the event. Such PR professionals should also advise the media about the implication of their coverage.
     It was not only the incident that exposed Islamabad police but also the post-incident management strategy, which called into question their preparedness and competence.. We have witnessed spokespersons of the hospital talking to the media with no overall direction as what should be shared. Besides his health condition, doctors have also been talking about the statements he has been making and his interaction with the police.
     There may be a team of two people talking to the media and that too strictly about their areas of concern. Doctors may concern themselves only about the health condition; whereas, the police may share details about the case and any progress they have made so far.
    Within media, there should be an internal mechanism that allows only responsible coverage of such incidents following a code of conduct that should, at all costs, safeguard public and national interest. PEMRA has the primary responsibility to regulate the media, and it must take firm action where the channels violate the law or the agreed code of conduct.  We are faced with serious terrorism and insurgency, and it is vital that the media is made aware of their responsibility and also pursued with legal action wherever necessary.
Responsibility of citizens
     The citizens too are not aware of their responsibilities, and their lack of cooperation has resulted in tragic incidents where many have lost their lives in secondary bomb blasts. Even in this case, the members of the public gathered in the area were exposed to serious risks and they could have been easily injured or even died by stray bullets.
    The direct broadcasting of shooting and eventual injuring of the armed man was violation of code of conduct of any civilized country. Millions of people including children and others were watching the open use of arms with little attempt at censorship. On the one hand, we proactively use censorship for curbing obscenity on the other hand, we have little compunction or censorship in what we show to the public while covering such incidents.
    The Government should initiate a media campaign to create awareness and to safeguard our future in the long term the youth should be educated about their responsibilities in such situations. 
Conclusion
    I would like to conclude my paper with review of an incident during which the police took action with horrifying outcomes. More than a decade ago, in Sialkot jail the prisoners took some judicial officials as hostage. The local police leadership after taking into considerations all the threat aspects took bold action that resulted in the release of the hostages but also led to two casualties in the firing that ensued. The officers were booked on a murder case and are still facing a long trial that has yet to be concluded. If the state cannot protect the members of the law enforcement who take action in fulfilling their legal responsibilities, no one will be ready to show any initiative in dealing with a crisis. Repeated failure of the police on a number of occasions is the direct result of political interference. The police are also confronted with persecution in carrying out their duties, which in any case entail risk of life including their own.
One lesson we must learn from this incident is that it is time for all of us to take a long hard look at how stakeholders must respond to such incidents and to overcome our weaknesses so as to develop a greater level of maturity and responsibility in dealing with similar situations in the future.