Saturday, January 26, 2013

Police: an isolated force



Mr. Mohammad Ali Babakhel is one of those few devoted police officers who is committed to bring meaningful reforms in police in Pakistan and convert it into a service instead of coercive arm of the government. He believes in real transformation of the force instead of cosmetic changes that do not last long. Afzal A Shigri

Published in daily Dawn on 25-01-2013
Police: an isolated force

RECENTLY, the Punjab Police established a model police station in the Vehari district under a provincial government programme to establish 51 such facilities. The thrust of the effort is to transform the ‘thana (police station) culture’ into a policing model where basic human rights are respected.
The term thana culture is used in Pakistan to refer to a general mindset on the part of the police which sees nothing wrong with abuses such as illegal detention, death in custody, corruption and the extraction of confessions through third-degree methods, all regular occurrences.
This is partly because when the police force was first set up by our colonial masters it was designed as a force to fight the public. It was not meant as a people-friendly agency.
Since independence, more than 20 commissions and committees have prepared reports about the ways to counter the thana culture, but we have yet to see any real change. These recommendations have tended to be general in nature, but hardly any effort has gone into translating even these into reality.
And yet, while the reality is that the thana culture is universally hated in this country, the police station remains the first step towards justice. Despite its flaws, it is still regarded as a symbol of the state that provides a sense of security.
There are some 325,000 male and female police personnel working in 1,544 police stations across the country. In more developed societies, policing is regarded as a service but here, it is regarded as an instrument of force. Are the police an isolated entity or a by-product of society?
Policing cannot be achieved in isolation from the public; the latter should expect service and security, while the police ought to be able to command cooperation, non-interference and respect.
The ideals of human rights cannot be achieved without communication between the police and the public. In much of the developing world, unfortunately, policing continues to be regarded as a non-developmental activity. On the other hand, developed countries have allocated resources to modernise their police forces.
Pakistan needs to give its police management some breathing space to present a realistic picture of the challenges and requirements of their profession. Where applicable, security of tenure, incorporated in the original text of the Police Order 2002, needs to be extended to the heads of police units, for this will result in the implementation of long-term projects.
In recent years the political and police leadership have realised that overall development in society is linked also to the capacity, development and image of the police force. Further, an autonomous police force should be fully accountable to democratic public bodies, not to individuals.
Nevertheless, in Pakistan policing remains a profession under stress and attacks are often carried out on police stations or personnel. When these are flashed across the media, the authority of the state is further eroded.
Here, unfortunately, setting up a police station is understood as erecting a building and providing it with a few men and a vehicle, when the force should be viewed as a specialised professional entity.
There are problems with the attitude of the public, too. Recently, crimes against certain high-profile people have put the police under tremendous pressure, but the public is reluctant to cooperate in the investigations, not realising that this might help the police to achieve success — and that success for the police translates to safety for the public.
Cooperation between the police and the public is essential for achieving arrests and conviction.
What are the other reasons the thana culture doesn’t change? One is that at the local level, police stations are used for political lobbying, thus becoming a source for strengthening already powerful individuals.
The stakes are high and for these individuals, status quo is the preferred option. They cannot afford a situation in which there is no room for nepotism, torture, inefficiency and so on — that is from where they draw their strength.
Change is possible, but only with cooperation between the police and the public. Policing needs to be made more adaptable, in line with changing technological and other developments.
Further, the police need persistent motivation from the public and the patronage of the government to stay committed to their task of combating crime; policemen need to feel themselves owned by and part of the public.
In this regard, the media can also play a role by focusing on those policemen killed in the line of duty, rather than constantly showing the force in a poor light.
An organised effort needs to be made to pay tribute to policemen such as Malik Saad, Safwat Ghayur, Iqbal Marwat, Sattar Khattak, Khan Raziq and Abid Ali. One of the ways to do this is by observing a special day of homage.
Policemen are expected to sacrifice their lives for society, but if society resists considering them a part of itself, how can a policeman maintain his dedication? In Pakistan, policemen are even assaulted in the streets.
As stated earlier, part of the problem is that provincial police departments have retained shades of imperialism. But the Motorway Police was conceived differently, with a service-oriented essence. Its success is proof that Pakistan can establish service-oriented and corruption-free police organisations.
Amendments to the law and the simplification of procedures cannot be achieved by the police; elected representatives need to do this. A policeman should be a symbol of security, and the police station of safety. With sufficient commitment, this can be achieved in Pakistan.
The writer is a deputy inspector general of the police.
alibabakhel@hotmail.com

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA

This is the Executive Summary of an excellent report on the subject by ICG. Full report is available on the website of ICG. All the law enforcers in Pakistan must read the report to understand the complexity of the problem of militancy in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of KPK and its possible solutions. Afzal A Shigri



Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA
Asia Report N°242 15 Jan 2013
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pakistan’s Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), which include Swat and six neighbouring districts and areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK), remains volatile more than three years after military operations sought to oust Islamist extremists. Militant groups such as the Sunni extremist Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and its Pakistani Taliban-linked Fazlullah faction are no longer as powerful in Swat and other parts of PATA as they were in 2008 and early 2009, but their leaders and foot soldiers remain at large, regularly attacking security personnel and civilians. If this once dynamic region is to stabilise, PATA’s governance, security and economic revival must become a top priority for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government in Islamabad and the Awami National Party (ANP)-led government in Peshawar – and for their successors following the next general elections.
While the militants continue to present the main physical threat, the military’s poorly conceived counter-insurgency strategies, heavy-handed methods and failure to restore responsive and accountable civilian administration and policing are proving counter-productive, aggravating public resentment and widening the gulf between PATA’s citizens and the state. Meanwhile neither the federal nor the KPK provincial government is fully addressing the security concerns of residents.
Public and political support for action against the TNSM and allied Pakistani Taliban networks in Swat and its neighbouring districts remains strong, demonstrated by the outrage against the 9 October 2012 attack by Mullah Fazlullah’s Taliban faction on Malala Yousafzai, a Swat-based fourteen-year-old activist for girls’ right to education. That attack has also further eroded public confidence in the military’s claims of having dismantled the insurgency and underscores the grave security challenges that PATA’s residents face.
The military’s continued control over the security agenda, governance and administration in PATA and the state’s failure to equip KPK’s police force with the tools and authority it needs to tackle extremist violence lie at the heart of the security and governance challenges. Some serious efforts have been made to enhance police capacity, functioning and presence on the streets, including by increasing the size of the force and the number of police stations, particularly in Swat. However, they are insufficient. The KPK police should be properly trained, equipped, and accountable. Islamabad and Peshawar, KPK’s provincial capital, need to abolish parallel law enforcement entities such as Levies, dismantle state-supported tribal lashkars (militias) and give KPK’s police the lead in enforcing the law and bringing extremists to justice.
Yet, the complexities of PATA’s legal framework still make upholding the rule of law a daunting task. Unlike the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), PATA is subject to Pakistan’s basic criminal and civil law framework and falls under the jurisdiction of the provincial KPK legislature (in addition to the National Assembly) and the Peshawar High Court and Supreme Court. However, under Article 247 of the constitution, laws apply to PATA, as in FATA, only if specifically extended by the governor (the federation’s representative), with the president’s consent.
Since formally joining KPK (then called Northwest Frontier Province) in 1969, PATA has also been governed by various parallel legal systems that have undermined constitutional rights and isolated it from the rest of KPK. More recent reforms have only expanded that isolation. Despite public opposition to Islamist militancy in Swat and neighbouring PATA districts, the ANP-led provincial government has not repealed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009, which imposed Sharia (Islamic law) in PATA as part of a military-devised peace deal with the Taliban-allied TNSM in April 2009. In August 2011, President Asif Ali Zardari promulgated the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011 (AACP) for PATA and FATA, vesting the military with virtually unchecked powers of arrest and detention and further undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. While the AACP provides legal cover for the military’s human rights abuses, the imposition of Sharia has made effective and accountable governance elusive.
Efforts to revive a shattered economy, once heavily dependent on tourism, have also faltered, and pressing humanitarian needs remain unmet because of continued instability and short-sighted military-dictated policies and methods. These include travel restrictions on foreigners, stringent requirements for domestic and international NGOs, abrasive and intrusive questioning at military checkposts and the military’s deep economic encroachment.
To overcome PATA’s rising security challenges, the national and provincial leaderships should reclaim the political space ceded to the military. Islamabad and Peshawar must develop and assume ownership over a reform agenda that ends PATA’s legal and political isolation, strengthens a deteriorating justice system, revokes laws that undermine constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and fully integrates the region into KPK.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To Pakistan’s Federal Government and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Provincial Government:
1.  Integrate the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) into KPK province fully by:
a) removing Articles 246 and 247 from the constitution, thereby ending PATA’s tribal status and allowing all laws passed by the national and provincial legislatures to be applicable;
b) merging PATA into the legal mainstream by abolishing the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009; and
2.  Mitigate the impact of conflict on PATA’s economy and ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance by:
a lifting all curbs on travel, including No Objection Certificate (NOC) requirements for foreigners visiting Malakand Division; and
b) removing restrictions on international and local NGOs in PATA, easing the process for foreign NGO workers to obtain residence and visit visas and directing the civil bureaucracy to phase out and ultimately end NOC requirements for international NGOs.
3.  Revise the draft Fair Trial Bill 2012 to:
a) empower only civilian agencies to investigate and gather intelligence, and exclude the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence and other military-controlled intelligence agencies from the bill’s list of authorised entities, making any such data they acquire inadmissible in court;
b) include a provision for federal and provincial parliamentary oversight and require standing committees on interior and home and tribal affairs in the National Assembly and KPK’s provincial assembly, respectively, or subcommittees formed under them, to inquire into complaints of unjustified invasions of privacy under the bill; and
c) require the higher judiciary to oversee the provision and issuing of warrants under the law and hold lower court judges accountable if they issue warrants without justification or fail to ensure that warrants are not abused by state authorities.
4.  Refocus on the basics of law enforcement and criminal justice, in addition to new surveillance measures under the Fair Trial bill, by:
a) enhancing protection afforded to witnesses, prosecutors and judges in terrorism-related cases;
b) modernising KPK’s police force, including by investing in crime scene units in individual police stations equipped with forensics and other modern investigative tools;
c) overhauling and modernising KPK’s forensic science laboratory;
d) extending ongoing efforts to upgrade and increase the number of police stations in Peshawar and Swat to Lower Dir, Upper Dir and Chitral, focusing initially on the more conflict-prone towns;
e) following through on recommendations to raise the number of female police officers and ensuring all have the same career advancement prospects as their male counterparts; and
f) raising the number of officers relative to constables in the KPK police and then maintaining a ratio of around 60/40 of constables to officers.
5.  Strengthen civilian-led law enforcement further by:
a) abolishing Levies and other parallel law enforcement entities in PATA and absorbing their personnel into the regular KPK police after meeting requisite training, vetting and other formal requirements;
b) dismantling all state-supported tribal lashkars (militias), terminating the practice of delegating security functions to unofficial entities; and
c) removing all military personnel from security checkposts, replacing them with police, including female personnel where conditions allow.
6.  Order the closure of all military-controlled internment centres, transferring detainees to judicial custody; and end all military-run deradicalisation and rehabilitation programs for captured militants, requiring that any such programs are civilian-led and under judicial oversight.
7.  Investigate allegations of extra-judicial killings, torture, illegal detention and other human rights abuses in PATA and take disciplinary action against any security personnel, including senior officials, found responsible.
To the Peshawar High Court and Supreme Court of Pakistan:
8.  Review the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulations 2011 and the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009 to determine their consistency with fundamental constitutional rights and principles, if they are not repealed by the government.
9.  Follow through on pledges to hold military and intelligence officials accountable for illegal detentions and other human rights abuses.
10.  Review the constitutionality of jirgas (tribal councils), including consistency with fundamental rights of equality, dignity and fair trial, drawing on the 2004 judgment of the Sindh High Court that deemed these forums unconstitutional.
11.  Revoke the National Judicial Policy of 2009 and end the practice of formulating policy through committees, speeches, and documents; speak instead through judicial judgments and develop case law that closes legal loopholes and holds lower court judges accountable for dismissing cases prematurely and failing to consider or order the production of evidence, such as publicly available video footage.
Islamabad/Brussels, 15 January 2013

Thursday, January 3, 2013

The National Counter Terrorism Authority



This article was published by Asia Society in their book on the subject of "Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reforms". Permission to publish it on this blog is acknowledged with gratitude.
Tariq Pervaz is a retired Inspector General Police who is an authority on anti-terrorism in Pakistan. In addition to many important command field assignments he worked as head of the agency dealing with the terrorism in Punjab and later as Director General of Federal Investigation Agency. It was he who conceived the idea of a national anti-terrorism authority and was its first head. Unfortunately due to non-serious attitude of the government and the obstinacy of the Ministry of Interior to retain its control scuttled a very good initiative. Tariq resigned and the organization for the reason explained in this paper failed to deliver and has been a colossal waste of resources. When Tariq Pervaz speaks the policy makers must listen and consider his advice seriously. Afzal A Shigri 





The National Counter Terrorism Authority
Tariq Parvez
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks necessitated fundamental changes in the way the world responded to terrorism. Many countries that considered   themselves particularly vulnerable to terrorism threats become aware of the acute need to evaluate the ability of their existing counter-terrorism institution to deal with the greater magnitude of the terrorist threat, to integrate counter-terrorism efforts, to strengthen anti-terrorism laws, and to initiate large-scale research to understand the different dimensions of the threat’s new face.
Comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategies were drawn up (e.g., the counter-terrorism strategy or CONTEST in the United kingdom), and a variety of new counter-terrorism institution were created (e.g., the Department of Homeland Security and National Counter-terrorism Committee in the United States, the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism in the United kingdom, and Detachment 88 in Indonesia) to develop and integrate national counter-terrorism efforts. New anti-terrorism laws were passed (e.g, THE USA PATRIOT ACT in the United States) or existing laws were updated with new provisions. Think tanks in the West focused increasingly on understanding the phenomenon of terrorism in the name of religion and anticipating future trends. Pakistan -- arguably the most important country in the global effort against terrorism -- by and large continued to deal with the new threat using an old framework of counter-terrorism. 
In 2009, however, the Pakistan federal government took a major step forward by setting up the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) to guide and integrate the national counter-terrorism efforts. This chapter will explain this concept and evaluate its potential.
The Existing System of Counter-terrorism
According to the Constitution of Pakistan, maintaining law and order is among the basic responsibilities of the country’s provinces. Policing is conducted at the provincial level, with each province maintaining its own police force. As far as law and order is concerned, the federal government’s responsibility is to provide additional support to provincial governments upon request. The federal governments has its own law enforcements agency, the Federal  Investigation Agency (FIA) , which is governed by an act of parliament and can investigate only those offenses allowed by the act.

Structures
The following structures currently exist to deal with counter terrorism in Pakistan:
·         Local police:  These forces have the authority to collect intelligence on terrorist networks and monitor those suspected of having links with terrorist (names are placed on the Fourth Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act). Local police have sole authority to investigate cases of terrorism that take place in their jurisdiction unless the investigation is transferred to another agency by relevant authority. 
·         Crime Investigation Department (CID), known as the counter Terrorism Department (CID) in Punjab province:  This body is meant to help focus counter-terrorism efforts in the respective province. It has the legal authority to collect, collate, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist network and to investigate cases of terrorism transferred to it from the local police by the provincial government. It maintains a database of terrorism who are most active in the province.
·         Special Branch: This is the province’s premier police intelligence agency. Since the creation of CIDs/CTD, the emphasis on collecting intelligence on terrorism has taken on secondary importance. The Special Branch, however, can collect intelligence on terrorism and pass it on to CIDs/CTD.
·         Federal Investigation Agency (FIA): The premier police investigation agency at the federal level. After the September 11 attacks, a new wing was set up within the FIA called the Special Investigation Group to investigate cases of terrorism referred to it through the mutual consent of the relevant provincial government and the federal government. The FIA also maintains a national database of individuals with terrorist connection.  
·         Intelligence Bureau (IB): The IB is the only police intelligence outfit at the federal level. It has a counter-terrorism wing that is responsible for collecting terrorism-related intelligence and passing it on to concerned quarters for necessary action.
·         Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): This is a predominantly military organization operating at the federal level. The counter-terrorism wing of the ISI is responsible for collecting intelligence on terrorist network and disseminating it to the concerned quarters.  
·         Frontier Corps: This is a paramilitary force that deals with the insurgency in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
·         Sindh Rangers: This is a paramilitary force that assists the Sindh police in carrying out anti-terrorism duties in Karachi. They have also been given police power of arrest.    
·         Military Intelligence and the Directorate of Military Operation: These two departments of the military are active in operation against insurgents in FATA and Swat.  
·         National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA): This institution was set up at the federal level in 2009. As will be explained, it is still experiencing growing pains and has not yet started to operate effectively.


Existing Counter-terrorism Efforts
Before discussing the concept, role, and structure of NACTA, It is necessary to describe some important area of concern in Pakistan’s existing effort in Pakistan.   
First, the existing national counter-terrorism effect in Pakistan is based almost exclusively on a capture/kill approach by the police and concerned paramilitary and military department. The drawback of a focus on arresting and killing militants is that it is extremely lopsided, as it does not place due emphasis on the process and factors that breed militants, nor does it seek measures to ensure conviction after militants are arrested. The net result is that although a large number of militants are arrested by security forces, large number of new recruits continues to join the ranks of the militants.  
Similarly, a lack of attention on securing the conviction of arrested militants in courts leads to an abysmally low conviction rate, which reduces the deterrence value of the criminal justice system in the eyes of militants. Even if they are arrested, suspected terrorists are usually sure that they will unlikely be convicted, for various reasons. The net result of this approach is that existing responses have very limited effectiveness in reducing militancy in the long term.
Second, Pakistan has no national counter-terrorism strategy despite 20 years of experience in combating terrorism. Consequently, the current effort is adhoc, lacks any nation sense of direction, and has no long term plan to deal with such a crucial threat. There is no national counter-terrorism action plan indicating what needs to be done, by whom, and according to what timeline. As a result, there is no unity of efforts at the national level to combat what many consider an existential threat to Pakistan and a threat to global peace.
Next, the existing national countertenor effort in Pakistan is fragmented, which is debilitating to the country’s response. The effort is broken up between the provincial police forces and intelligence agencies, between  the provinces and federal government, between different ministries and departments of the federal governments, and, above all, between the civil and military counter-terrorism department. The existing national counter-terrorism effort is led by the military, with the ISI acting as the lead agency and the police playing a secondary role. This is a fundamentally flawed approach. Counter-terrorism basically involves arresting terrorists, collecting evidence against them, and getting them convicted in the courts. This is primarily a police job, but leaving this task to an intelligence agency - particularly one that is predominantly military in nature - introduces fundamental distortion, most clearly manifested in the missing person’s phenomenon that is currently being witnessed in Pakistan. It is absolutely imperative to declare the police force the lead agency for counter-terrorism in the provinces.
The existing policy of using militant proxies as instruments of state policy to achieve foreign policy goals leads to ambiguity in dealing with militant entities. There is a need to have a civilian agency in place with the capability and stature to discuss nation security policy to give well considered policy option to the government to debate and decide in consultation with the political leadership, military, and other stakeholders.
Finally, efforts to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in Pakistan through rigorous research are almost nonexistent. Research on terrorism – related subjects must be encouraged, both in government sponsored think tanks and in independent research groups connected to civil society.    
The Concept of NACTA   
  NACTA was conceived as a civilian agency operating at the nation level and responsible for orchestrating and coordinating the national counter-terrorism effort by taking the following steps:
·         Draw up a national counter Terrorism and Extremism strategy (NACTES), with input from all nation and provincial stakeholders for approval by the political leadership
·         Generate a National Action plan to implement the NACTES, in consultation with all implementing departments and institution, according to set timeline.
·         Address all three dimensions of militancy: violent extremism, terrorism, and insurgency.
·         Draw up a research plan to look into the various aspects of militancy in Pakistan and to provide support for research projects.
·         Collect, collate, and disseminate intelligence from all provincial, federal, and military agencies as part of an effort to prepare a comprehensive national security analysis for government at the federal and provincial levels.
·         Act as a one-stop shop for liaising with international organization and other states with regard to counterterrorism interaction and assistance.                 
                                                
The structure of NACTA
As originally envisioned, NACTA is to be headed by a national coordinator (equivalent in rank to the inspector general of police) who is assisted by a deputy national coordinator. It should comprise four wings: research, intelligence, counter extremism, and an international liaison            
  • Research wing: Headed by an eminent educationist or research scholar assisted by research officers, this wing will carry out research in areas relevant to militancy in Pakistan. The need for this wing cannot be exaggerated in view of the fact that in Pakistan, research is generally perceived as a low-priority activity. Not only are there very few serious think tanks working on militancy, but also the government does not provide funds to finance research. Without research, most policy making in Pakistan is based on anecdotal evidence, personal experiences, or unverified statistics.

  • Counter extremism wing: Headed by an eminent educator, a religions scholar, a media expert, or any suitable person with relevant experience, this wing will address a gap in the existing counter-terrorism effort, which focuses on a capture/ kill approach and ignore the process and ideology of militancy that breeds new terrorism. Presently, terrorism organizations have an open field to spread their narrative and have a steady stream of new recruits.   

  • Intelligence Wing: Headed by a senior police officer, with representative from the ISI, IB, and provincial CIDs/CID.

  • International Liaison Wing: Head by a police officer and responsible for dealing with international bodies in the field of counterterrorism and extremism.

The Present status of NACTA
Although it was formally set up in 2009, NACTA has yet to take off. This is partly attributable to a tussle over ownership of the organization. Presently, it is part of the ministry of interior, which maintains direct and strict control over it. Some provinces and federal intelligence agencies, however, feel that if NACTA is to become an effective coordinating body among counter terrorism stakeholders in the province and the intelligence agencies, it should be under the direct supervision of the prime minister of Pakistan. Not only would this lend necessary stature to such a coordinating body, but reporting to the prime minister would also make it more effective ant useful.
This issue has still not been resolved, and as of June 2012 NACTA leadership was in the process of preparing legislation to be presented to the prime minister for a final decision. It goes without saying that if NACTA continues to be a part of the Ministry of Interior, it will be a nonstarter, with important stakeholders such as provincial governments and federal intelligence agencies not fully cooperating with it.
Prospects for NACTA
NACTA would be an institution that not only would take a long-terms measure of the challenge of terrorism in Pakistan, but also would ensure that all dimension of militancy in Pakistan --violent extremism, terrorism, and insurgency -- would be treated with due importance . As the supreme national counter terrorism civilian body, NACTA can influence overall national security policy effectively transferring, in due course, the ownership of the national security strategy from the military to the civilian government in Pakistan.   
In the strategic dialogue between the United States and Pakistan on security held in Islamabad in June 2010, it was decided that the first point of cooperation between the United States and Pakistan for achieving strategic unity in counter terrorism would involve strengthening and supporting NACTA. It was also decided that the National Counter terrorism Committee in the United States and NACTA in Pakistan would cooperate closely with each other as twin organization. For counter terrorism efforts in Pakistan to succeed, it is necessary to implement the decision taken by the two countries during the strategic Dialogue on Defense.
The need for coordination of the national counter terrorism effort by a civilian agency with adequate stature, authority, and competence is critical to the success of the Pakistan counter terrorism response. NACTA is an idea whose time has come. Sooner or later, the Pakistan government will need to depend on this national institution to get its act together on counter terrorism.
Recommendations
To ensure that NACTA is an effective institution, the following recommendations are proposed:
  • Requisite legislation to establish NACTA must be enacted as soon as possible so that it can start functioning effectively. The legislation should have input from all stakeholders, including the provinces, federal government departments, and intelligence agencies; it should not be prepared by the Ministry of Interior alone. The Parliamentary Committee on National Security, headed by Senator Raza Rabbani, is a good forum in which to discuss and finalize the legislation. The legislation would be more useful if the Defense Cabinet Committee also approved it, as it would then have the support of all political parties represented in parliament as well as the military authorities and the provinces. This would give NACTA the required stature and acceptability to act as the supreme national coordinating body in counter-terrorism and counter extremism.

  • NACTA must be immediately attached to the Prime Minister Secretariat, and the head of NACTA must be given the status of a minister of state who has the ear of the prime minister. This would help alleviate the growing pains of the organization, enabling it to start working at the earliest.  

  • A skeleton structure should be raised to start work on developing the basic framework of the organization. This skeleton structure must consist of personnel selected on the basic of qualification and merit, through a transparent system, preferably through the Federal Public Service Commission. The present practice of changing head of NACTA every few months must be stopped. In less than two years NACTA has had five heads, making it into a sort of parking lot, with officers waiting there until other position fall vacant. This indicates that the government does not take the agency seriously, adversely affecting the take off this excellent initiative. Additionally, this puts off international donors, who take it as a measure of the seriousness of the government to deal with terrorism and extremism.

  • International assistance for counter terrorism in Pakistan should go toward capacity building in NACTA in the field of research on counter terrorism and counter extremism, developing the ability to carry out analysis of intelligence on counter terrorism and counter extremism, and developing and disseminating a counter narrative to militant ideology, besides other areas listed out by NACTA leadership.  At the time of its establishment in January 2009, the United Kingdom and the European Union showed keen interest in its development but gave up when there was not much progress. The United States should implement provisions for NACTA, as set forth during the June 2010 U.S.-- Pakistan Dialogue on Defense.